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 Wage Growth Implications of Fixed-Term Employment:  
An Analysis by Contract Duration and Job Mobility 
 
Abstract   
 
Focusing on Spain, where fixed-term workers account for a third of the wage and salary 
workforce, we examine the wage growth implications of fixed-term employment of varying 
duration while distinguishing between wage growth occurring on-the-job versus via job mobility.  
Wage growth among employees with indefinite work contracts largely occurs via job mobility, 
whereas fixed-term workers gain via job mobility as well as on-the-job.  Consequently, job 
stayers with fixed-term contracts a year ago narrow their wage gap with respect to similar 
counterparts with indefinite-term contracts.  Yet, this effect is solely driven by the 10.5 
percentage points higher wage growth experienced by fixed-term workers with 6-months 
contracts able to keep their jobs beyond their initial contract period.  Given the limited number of 
short-term temporary workers in those circumstances, the overall wage gap between past fixed-
term and indefinite-term workers is unlikely to vanish in the near future.       
 
 I. Introduction 
 
The 1990s were characterized by the rapid growth of non-standard work arrangements as 
the result of both an increased demand on the part of employers and an increased supply of 
workers who prefer such arrangements.  Spain, in particular, constitutes a unique case with more 
than one third of its total salaried employment in non-standard work arrangements during the 
past decade (Toharia et al. 2001, Dolado et al.  2002).  The vast majority of these workers were 
fixed-term workers holding jobs lacking an explicit or implicit contract for long-term 
employment.   
Fixed-term jobs may have served as a stepping-stone to better paid jobs, as in the case of 
school-to-work and welfare-to-work transitions, or have provided a second household income 
(e.g. Bugarin 1998).  Nonetheless, workers in fixed-term work arrangements often endure lower 
job stability and wages than employees in regular, full-time indefinite jobs (Handler 1995, Peck 
and Theodore 2000).  Although some of the lower wages might be due to their generally lower 
educational attainment and experience, a series of studies have shown that a wage differential 
among the various types of work contracts remains even after controlling for these workers’ 
characteristics (e.g. Jimeno and Toharia (1993) and Bentolila and Dolado (1994) for the Spanish 
case).  The limited job stability and opportunities for advancement characteristic of fixed-term 
work arrangements may harm workers through their inability to be promoted to or to access 
higher paying jobs in the near future, thus, affecting their future wage potential.  
Consequently, although it may be counterproductive to limit these types of jobs given the 
existing demand by firms and voluntary supply by some employees, we need to be aware of the 
implications of fixed-term work arrangements.  While previous work has provided evidence of 
the contemporaneously lower wages earned by fixed-term workers, no studies have yet examined 
1 the impact that the duration of fixed-term employment may have on the employee’s future wages 
due to the lack of appropriate longitudinal data on both wages and the duration of the fixed-term 
contract.  Furthermore, the existing literature has not distinguished between wage growth 
occurring on-the-job when the fixed-term contract is used as a screening device versus wage 
growth taking place via job-to-job mobility –of special interest given the short-life of fixed-term 
contracts.  Therefore, we pose the following questions: How does the wage growth experienced 
by workers who have previously held a fixed-term contract compare to that of their counterparts 
with open-ended (or indefinite) contracts?  Does wage growth differ according to the duration of 
the fixed-term contract held by the employee?  How much of this wage growth occurs on-the-job 
versus via voluntary job mobility?   
This paper addresses the aforementioned questions with an analysis of the wage growth 
implications of fixed-term employment of varying duration, while distinguishing between wage 
growth occurring on-the-job versus via voluntary job mobility.  The analysis uses Spanish data 
from the 1995 through 2001 waves of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), a 
unique longitudinal survey containing wage and contract information for the Spanish workforce. 
In addition to information on the respondent’s previous job mobility, the analysis controls for 
their personal human capital and job-related characteristics possibly affecting any lasting effects 
of fixed-term employment on wages.    
Several findings are worth summarizing.  First, wage growth among indefinite workers 
primarily occurs via job mobility.  This is to be expected as workers with indefinite-term 
contracts would not leave the security of their jobs unless a significantly better job opportunity 
were to come along their way.  In contrast, fixed-term employees experience wage gains via job 
mobility as well as on-the-job.  As a result, the wage growth experienced by job stayers with 
2 fixed-term contracts a year ago is 4 percentage points higher than the wage growth enjoyed by 
similar employees with indefinite work contracts.  On-the-job wage growth among fixed-term 
employees may be the payoff to their greater effort in an attempt to keep their jobs (Alba-
Ramirez 1994) or a by-product of the conversion of their temporary work status to indefinite 
after a preliminary probationary or screening process (e.g. Loh (1994) and Wang and Weiss 
(1998)).  Secondly, fixed-term workers’ wage growth performance varies substantially, not only 
according to their recent job mobility, but also depending on the duration of the contract held.  
Specifically, employees with short fixed-term contracts lasting less than 6-months experience the 
greater on-the-job wage gains of all temporary workers.  This is expected to the extent that these 
workers have been able to keep their jobs beyond the time period stipulated in their contracts.         
Summarizing, fixed-term workers are able to narrow their wage gap with respect to 
similar counterparts with indefinite-term contracts in the past; however, this is only true among 
job stayers.  Furthermore, the narrowing of the wage gap between fixed-term and indefinite-term 
employees is solely driven by the 10.5 percentage points higher wage growth experienced by 
workers with 6-months contracts who manage to keep their jobs.  To the extent that: a) fixed-
term contracts of less than 6-months duration only account for less than 20 percent of all fixed-
term employment, b) only an average of 34 percent of workers with contracts lasting less than 6-
months are able to keep their jobs beyond their initial contract period,
1 the wage gap between 
past fixed-term and indefinite-term employees is likely to persist.            
II.  Legal and Institutional Framework of Spanish Fixed-term Employment  
Before discussing the wage growth implications of holding a particular type of work 
contract, it is essential to learn about the institutional and legal environment surrounding the 
                                                       
1 Authors’ tabulations using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). 
3 different types of work contracts available in Spain so as to gain a better understanding of the 
prevalence of fixed-term employment in the country.   
Fixed-term contracts were first regulated in the Workers’ Statute (1980) and its 1984 
reform (Jimeno and Toharia 1993).  Specifically, the new legislation regulated the circumstances 
under which a fixed-term contract may be signed by the parties, as well as the duration, pay, and 
other characteristics of the fixed-term contract itself.  Failure to follow the legislated 
requirements could result in the presumption of the work relationship to be indefinite and, 
therefore, in the automatic conversion of the fixed-term contract into an indefinite contract. 
   In addition to training and practical work contracts (typically lasting between 6 months 
and two years), four different types of fixed-term work contracts were contemplated in the 
Workers’ Statute, article 15.1, the Royal Decree Law 2720/1998, and the Law 12/2001: (1) 
Contracts for a specific task or service (contratos para obra ó servicio determinado), (2) 
Insertion contracts (contratos de inserción), (3) Casual employment contracts (contratos 
eventuales por circumstancias de la producción), and (4) Fixed-term work contracts to fill a 
vacancy created by a worker on leave (contratos de interinidad).
2  In all four cases, the 
distinguishing factor between the regulation of fixed-term and indefinite contracts are dismissal 
costs.
3  In particular, common to all fixed-term contracts is the provision of an advance notice for 
dismissal of 15 days if the contract duration exceeds one year.  The exception are fixed-term 
contracts to fill the vacancy created by a worker on leave, for which the provision of an advance 
notice for dismissal depends on what the parties agreed upon signing the contract.  If the work 
relationship is continued after completion of the project, time period, or circumstances detailed 
                                                       
2 A detailed explanation of the characteristics of each of these types of contracts is contained in the appendix. 
3 It should be noted that there are not systematic institutional differences in the treatment of fixed-term and 
indefinite workers in Spain.  Specifically, the Spanish law explicitly prohibits the inferior treatment of fixed-term 
workers relative to indefinite workers in terms of pay.  See: TS 13-5-91, RJ 3909, RJ 5483, and RJ 118.  
4 in the contract, the contract becomes an indefinite work contract.  Additionally, if the fixed-term 
contract falls within categories (1) or (3) mentioned above, the worker is entitled to receive the 
severance payment negotiated through collective bargaining or, most commonly, a payment 
corresponding to the salary of 8 days per year of tenure.      
  On the contrary, indefinite workers’ dismissals typically need to be notified to the worker 
and worker’s representative with an advance notice of 30 days, during which the employee also 
has the right to use up to 6 hours a week to look for another job (Workers’ Statute, articles 51 
and 53).  Unless otherwise negotiated by the parties, severance payments traditionally amount to 
20 days per year of tenure with a maximum of 12 months pay.
4  Nonetheless, as Toharia and 
Ojeda (1999) further explain, the worker has the right to sue the firm for unfair dismissal.  In that 
case, bargaining over the severance payment takes place resulting in the vast majority of the 
cases in severance pays well above the amounts established by law and closer to the amount of 
45 days pay per year of tenure with a maximum of 42 months pay contemplated by law for the 
unfair dismissal.
5  In the case bargaining fails, the case goes to the Labor Courts.  If the latter 
decide the dismissal was unfair, the employer also has to pay the wages and social security taxes 
corresponding to the time period between the dismissal and the notification of the judicial 
decision.   
Through their lower dismissal costs, fixed-term contracts seemed to be successful at 
promoting firms’ use of fixed-term work contracts and combating, at least to a certain extent, the 
traditionally high unemployment rate.  Fixed-term contracts quickly proliferated during the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Additionally, the Constitutional Courts in TCo 177/1993 stated that the shorter contract duration is not sufficient to 
justify a lower rate of pay.     
4 The amount of the severance pay regulated by law varies according to the cause alleged by the firm for the 
dismissal.  Toharia and Ojeda (1999) note that most individual dismissals take the form of an “objective dismissal” 
(based on economic and technological circumstances) or a disciplinary dismissal since the latter requires no advance 
notice and no initial severance payment.   
5 second half of the 1980s and have accounted for approximately one third of the total salaried 
workforce since 1992 despite a series of reforms in 1994, 1997, and the year 2001 promoting the 
use of indefinite work contracts.
6  Given the lower dismissal costs still characterizing their work 
contracts, fixed-term workers endure greater job insecurity than their indefinite counterparts.  In 
a country with traditionally high unemployment rates, the greater job insecurity typical of fixed-
term work contracts explains the large fraction of fixed-term workers claiming to be 
involuntarily employed in fixed-term jobs due to their inability to obtain an indefinite work offer 
(Amuedo-Dorantes 2000).  As a result, more able workers who can provide a noisy signal of 
their skill to firms may be more likely to get into desired indefinite jobs, while potentially less 
skilled individuals may display a higher likelihood of working in fixed-term jobs.  Workers from 
the higher end of the skill distribution occupy indefinite jobs, while workers from the lower end 
of the skill distribution display a tendency to be sorted into fixed-term jobs.  Under these 
circumstances, panel estimates that hold constant the individual-specific element of skill as well 
as other unobserved worker characteristics – such as their greater work commitment or ability, 
provide leverage to separate the effect of holding a particular type of work contract from that of 
workers’ unobserved skill on wages.   
III.  Wage Growth by Type of Work Contract and Job Mobility 
A)  The Role of Contract Duration  
According to human capital theory, previous work experience, whether fixed-term or 
indefinite, adds to the individual human capital, resulting in higher potential productivity and, 
therefore, higher wages (Mincer 1974; Oi 1995).  However, work experiences frequently differ 
                                                                                                                                                                           
5 While this option is also available to fixed-term workers by law (Supreme Court, April 16, 1999 – RJ 4424), the 
majority of dismissals found unfair correspond to indefinite workers’ dismissals.  
6 in a variety of aspects across types of work contracts.  Therefore, there are various reasons as for 
why fixed-term workers and their counterparts with indefinite work contracts might earn 
different wages and experience different wage growth patterns.  On one hand, fixed-term 
workers may earn lower wages than their employees with indefinite work contracts if their jobs 
are dead-end jobs offering few opportunities for advancement.  Alternatively, fixed-term and 
indefinite work experiences may elicit different responses from employers if job stability is 
believed to signal worker quality.  While still valuing experience, employers may view a fixed-
term worker as a less-productive employee than an indefinite worker given the involuntary 
nature of most fixed-term work (Amuedo-Dorantes 2000).
7  This effect might be particularly 
acute among workers with short-term fixed-term contracts.  As a result, employers may 
statistically discriminate against fixed-term workers by offering them lower wages than if they 
had been employed through indefinite work contracts.  In doing so, employers may favor a 
segmented labor market composed of fixed-term or secondary workers in jobs with low pay and 
indefinite or primary workers in jobs offering higher wages (Bentolila and Dolado 1994).
8  In 
this case, fixed-term work would harm workers’ current wages.
9   On the other hand, fixed-term 
workers may earn higher wages than their counterparts holding indefinite work contracts if they 
exert greater effort in order to keep their jobs or if employers compensate them for their limited 
job security and worse working conditions (Alba-Ramirez 1994).   
                                                                                                                                                                           
6 Refer to Toharia et al. (2001) and to Dolado et al. (2002) for more detailed descriptions of the evolution of fixed-
term employment from 1987 onwards.    
7 This might be the case if fixed-term workers exhibit, in general, poor work skills, fixed-term employment might 
signal to some employers limited work commitment or work ethic –failure to show up, absenteeism, conflict with 
others, or inability to perform work.  As pointed out in Delsen (1995, p. 81), there is evidence of a negative link 
between fixed-term employment and labor productivity in Spanish manufacturing firms.  As a result, employers 
might statistically discriminate against fixed-term workers.  See Spence (1973) for a reference to statistical 
discrimination.    
8 Refer to Cain (1976), Elliott (1991), and Delsen (1995) for a review of the literature on segmented labor markets.   
9 Similar stigma effects are discussed by Gregory and Jukes (2001), Belzil (1995), Lockwood (1991), and 
Vishwanath (1989) referred to the effect of an unemployment record. 
7 More importantly, independently of whether they earn less contemporaneously than their 
permanent counterparts, fixed-term workers may experience a significantly higher wage growth.  
The latter may occur on-the-job if, for example, the fixed-term worker was hired on a temporary 
basis as a screening device for a better paid and more stable position.  Alternatively, via their 
greater job mobility, fixed-term workers may be able to take advantage of new job opportunities 
offering higher wages than less mobile counterparts with indefinite work contracts.   
A series of studies have examined the contemporaneous wage effect of the type of work 
contract held by the employee by running augmented Mincer wage regressions.  Using U.S. data 
and after controlling for age, education, race, geographic region, industry, union status, and 
occupation, Houseman (1997) shows that agency temporaries, on-call workers, and direct-hire 
temporaries earn between 5 percent and 19 percent less than regular full-time employees.  
Likewise, using a longitudinal file of administrative data from the State of Washington, Segal 
and Sullivan (1998) also examine wage differentials in the fixed-term help industry and found a 
10 to 20 percent wage differential between agency temporaries and other employees.  Also using 
U.S. data, this time from the 1990-1993 SIPP panels, Lane et al. (2003) compare mean earnings 
of past fixed-term help industry workers a year later to those of past non-fixed-term workers.  
They find that mean earnings for fixed-term help industry workers are lower than those of 
similar workers who got non-fixed-term jobs.  Similarly, using data from the British Household 
Panel Survey for the period 1991-1997, Booth et al. (2002) examine the wage profiles of 
workers who have ever held a temporary job and compare them to those of permanent workers.  
They find that fixed-term jobs are effective stepping-stones to permanent jobs, with the wage gap 
between temporary and permanent workers disappearing when past temporary workers obtain a 
permanent job.  However, Lane et al. (2003) and Booth et al. (2002) analyses do not provide any 
8 information on the differential wage effect that fixed-term work may have according to its 
duration, nor do they distinguish between the wage growth occurring on-the-job versus via job 
mobility.     
Focusing on Spain, Jimeno and Toharia (1993) estimate the wage penalty associated with 
fixed-term work to be between 8 percent and 11 percent.  Similarly, Bentolila and Dolado (1994) 
find evidence of lower wages for fixed-term workers relative to indefinite workers.  Nonetheless, 
possibly due to the lack of longitudinal data on both the duration of fixed-term employment and 
wages, the literature has not addressed the effect of the duration of fixed-term work on future 
wage growth nor the role played by job mobility on such wage growth.    
B)  The Role of Job Mobility  
As noted earlier, job mobility may affect workers’ wage growth (e.g. Bartel and Borjas 
(1981), Mincer (1986) and Keith and McWilliams (1995, 1999)).  Because fixed-term workers 
might be more likely to voluntarily switch jobs than the so-called permanent employees given 
the short-life of their contracts, there is a possibility that wage growth is primarily realized via 
job mobility.  Alternatively, if fixed-term contracts are used as a screening device, significant 
wage growth may take place while on-the-job.  Yet, previous work on the wage implications of 
contingent work contracts has not controlled for the effect of job mobility on wage growth nor 
distinguished between wage growth taking place on-the-job versus via job mobility.   
In what follows, we examine the wage growth implications of fixed-term work of varying 
duration (e.g. six months or less, 7-12 months, and more than 12 months) while accounting for 
workers’ recent job mobility.  The analysis tests the following hypotheses: (a) whether previous 
fixed-term work affects workers’ wage growth once we account for job mobility; (b) whether 
9 wage growth differs according to contract length; and (c) whether wage growth occurs on-the-
job or via job mobility.      
IV.  Data and Some Descriptive Evidence 
A)  Data
For the purpose of this analysis, we use Spanish data from seven survey waves of the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP), a longitudinal survey started by the European 
Union member countries in 1994 following the Directives from the European Commission.
10  
The Spanish survey follows a panel of approximately 8,000 households.  In addition to its 
information on the type of work contract held, wage being paid, and other work-related 
characteristics, the data set includes pertinent information on demographic, income, household, 
and geographic characteristics.  In fact, this is the only nationally representative and longitudinal 
survey in Spain containing both wage and work contract information.
11  Nonetheless, 
information on the type of work contract held was only recorded from 1995 onwards.  
Furthermore, the ECHP does not collect information on the type of work contract held by wage 
and salary workers employed for less than 15 hours/week due to their limited labor force.  
Consequently, we use a balanced panel of civilian wage and salary workers working at least 15 
hours/week with valid data on the variables from the second through the seventh waves of the 
ECHP.   
                                                       
10 Information on the data sampling and sampling error is provided in the data appendix.   
11 While work-related information, such as the type of work contract, is readily available in the labor force survey 
(or Encuesta de Población Activa) and other Spanish department of labor surveys (such as the Encuesta de 
Coyuntura Laboral), wage data are only collected in small, often non-representative, one-time surveys and in the 
periodic Encuesta de Salarios.  The latter is a nationally representative survey of all occupations and industries, but 
its information revolves around industry, occupation, and wages; therefore, lacking information on individual level 
controls needed for this empirical analysis.     
10 The wage variable is the logarithm of average hourly wages, computed as the ratio of 
monthly wage income to weekly hours of work.
12  Hourly wages are deflated using the consumer 
price index.
13  Workers in the ECHP report their type and duration of their work contract.  The 
ECHP distinguishes among indefinite contracts, fixed-term contracts, other non-specified 
contract types, or no contract at all.  We created work contract dummies for each of these 
categories.  Within fixed-term work contracts, we also create contract dummies for the various 
self-reported contract lengths: up to six months, between six months and one year, or more than 
one year.  We create a job mobility dummy variable that utilizes the information collected by the 
survey on whether the employee held another job during the previous year.  To the extent that the 
duration in fixed-term employment is influenced by contract terminations and contract 
conversions into permanent employment (Güell and Petrongolo 2003), it is important to purge 
out any potential effects of contract duration induced by the worker’s mobility out of fixed-term 
employment.  A detailed description of the variables used in the analysis is contained in Table A 
in the appendix.   
Table B provides a summary of the main personal and work characteristics of fixed-term 
and indefinite workers in our sample.  As evidenced from Table B, fixed-term workers earn less, 
on average, than workers with indefinite work contracts.  Part of this wage difference is due to 
workers’ observed characteristics.  For instance, fixed-term workers are typically younger, less 
educated, and have less work experience than their counterparts with indefinite work contracts.  
Similarly, workers with indefinite work contracts appear more likely to be employed in higher-
skill occupations.  Alternatively, wage differences between workers with fixed-term versus 
                                                       
12 We carefully checked the data for outliers and decided neither to top-code nor bottom-code the data since the top 
and bottom 2 percent of the wage observations in our final data set (these are the extremes often coded in other data 
sets) appeared reasonable given the information contained in the individual records.    
11 indefinite work contracts may be the result of unobserved differences in the “quality” of workers.  
Hence, it may be important to account for individual level heterogeneity via fixed-effects 
estimations.  Finally, the figures in Table B also emphasize the higher wage growth as well as 
job mobility rates of fixed-term workers; thus underscoring the importance of accounting for job 
mobility when examining the wage growth experienced by past fixed-term workers.                          
B)  Some Descriptive Evidence
  One of the major concerns with fixed-term work is the limited opportunity for 
advancement often characterizing these work arrangements, which may harm workers’ ability to 
access better jobs paying higher wages in the near future.  The figures in Table 1 and Table 2 
illustrate this point by displaying transition rates into indefinite-term work as well as differences 
in average wage growth rates experienced by past fixed-term and indefinite-term employees.
14  
Table 1 displays all transitions into and out of different labor force statuses by job stayers 
and job movers.  We refer to ‘job-to-job’ wage growth as wage growth occurring via job 
mobility and not simply by either signing or renewing a contract.  By the same token, we refer to 
‘on-the-job’ wage growth as wage growth taking place while holding the same job, whether it is 
with the same contract or with a renewed one.  We focus our attention to fixed-term and 
indefinite-term workers object of our analysis.  However, we also briefly comment the results for 
other types of workers, as it is the case with workers without a contract, but pay less attention to 
workers in the other contract category as we are simply unaware of who are the workers with 
non-specified contracts in the survey.  A few findings are worth discussing from Table 1.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
13 This is the national CPI series using 1992 as the base year from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística.  It can be 
found at their web page: http://www.ine.es/daco/ipc.htm.  
14 While our paper focuses on wage and salary workers, we display the entire employment-unemployment transition 
matrix to provide the reader with a point of reference when examining these fluxes.  See Amuedo-Dorantes (2000) 
for a more detailed analysis of fixed-term employment hazard rates and fixed-term workers’ transition rates out of 
12 First, turnover rates are in the range of 34 to 66 percent among fixed-term workers.  The 
vast majority of these job movers (between 40 and 42 percent depending on the type of fixed-
term contract held) transition to a new fixed-term job, thus perpetuating their temporary work 
status.  Their next most frequent transition is to unemployment, with an average of 23 to 30 
percent of them becoming unemployed one year later.  Only 14 to 21 percent of fixed-term 
workers are working on a permanent basis a year later.  As such, at a mere descriptive level, 
fixed-term employment does not seem to function as an immediate stepping-stone to more stable 
employment.  Furthermore, only between 8 and 11 percent of past fixed-term workers moving 
out from their jobs exit the workforce, confirming the fact that most fixed-term workers are 
relatively young.   
A second set of findings from Table 1 refer to the very distinct job mobility pattern 
displayed by employees with indefinite-term contracts.  Contrary to what we find for fixed-term 
employees, only 10 percent of employees with indefinite-term contracts in the past transition out 
of this labor force status.  The majority of these job movers (32 percent of them) are holding a 
new indefinite-term contract a year later.  The next most frequent transition is to out of the 
workforce (possibly into retirement).  As such, only 17 percent of them become unemployed a 
year later relative to up to 30 percent of past fixed-term employees.  In general, the 
aforementioned figures underscore the job security and stability characterizing indefinite work 
contracts, as very few permanent workers are willing to switch jobs and, if they do so, their most 
common transition is to a new indefinite-term contract.  
Finally, the upper panel of Table 1 also displays the labor force status transitions 
experienced by job movers without a contract a year ago –often referred to as informal sector 
                                                                                                                                                                           
fixed-term employment and into new fixed-term jobs, indefinite jobs, other type of work, unemployment, and out of 
the workforce.     
13 employees to the extent that their work is undeclared to appropriate government authorities and, 
consequently, unregulated and untaxed.  Approximately 39 percent of job movers previously 
lacking a contract transition to jobs where they formalize their work status within the period of 
one year.  Yet, their most common transition is to unemployment (32 percent).    
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows contract and labor force transitions experienced by 
workers who manage to keep their jobs over the course of one year.  Perhaps the most noticeable 
result is the fact that the majority of past fixed-term workers (between 51 and 68 percent) 
continue to be employed on a temporary basis one year later.  Nonetheless, between 32 and 49 
percent have been promoted and now hold an indefinite-term contract.  Therefore, many of these 
temporary workers –particularly those with contracts lasting less than 6-months– should be 
experiencing a significant wage growth.  Finally, workers lacking a work contract in the past 
continue to be, for the most part, employed on an informal basis a year later.  Yet, a non-
negligible thirty seven percent of them sign either fixed-term or indefinite-term contracts.        
How do fixed-term and indefinite workers compare in terms of wage gains a year later?  
Table 2 displays the average hourly wage growth rates of past fixed-term and indefinite-term 
workers and assesses the significance of any differences between the two groups.  Due to the 
recognized effect that job mobility might play on wages, we tabulate wage growth rates and their 
differences according to any recent job mobility practices.  Overall, the figures in Table 2 reveal 
the higher wage growth rates enjoyed by fixed-term workers relative to their counterparts in 
more stable work arrangements irrespectively of their job mobility.  Yet, as we distinguish 
between job movers and job stayers, it becomes apparent that wage growth is more prominent 
on-the-job than via job mobility in the case of fixed-term employees, whereas the opposite is true 
for employees with indefinite-term contracts.  Furthermore, these differences are accentuated the 
14 shorter the duration of the fixed-term contract.  For instance, past fixed-term workers with 6-
months contracts experience the largest wage growth rate, surpassing the wage growth rate 
enjoyed by employees with more permanent jobs by 7 to 13 percent depending on their job 
mobility practices.  These differences reach 10 percent in the case of past fixed-term workers 
with a one-year contract and 5 percent for fixed-term workers with a one-year plus contract one 
year ago among job stayers.  Finally, other workers with precarious employment situations, as is 
the case with informal sector employees, also have more to gain wage-growth wise from an 
extended employment relationship than their counterparts with indefinite-term contracts.  As 
with fixed-term workers, this is not surprising as the continuation of their informal jobs beyond a 
one year period already signals employer satisfaction with workers’ performance.  
In sum, the repetitive nature of fixed-term employment and the relatively low transition 
rate into permanent employment displayed by Table 1 (a maximum of 21 percent of 51 percent 
of job movers) cast doubt on the effectiveness of temporary jobs in serving as a stepping-stone 
into more stable employment.  Yet, the figures in Table 2 indicate that the wage gap between 
fixed-term and permanent workers may narrow at a relatively fast rate even without further 
consideration for the type of work contract held one year later.  In what follows, we carry out a 
more rigorous analysis of the wage growth implications of past fixed-term employment of 
varying duration while distinguishing according to workers’ recent job mobility patterns.           
V.  Empirical Modeling and Methodology   
As previously discussed, the type of work contract held by employees at the beginning of 
any given period may affect their wage growth during that period through two different channels. 
First, fixed-term workers may face different intra-firm wage growth schedules than those of their 
permanent counterparts.  Second, since fixed-term workers are exposed to higher turnover rates 
15 via contract expiration and voluntary separations, the wage effects of job mobility may differ for 
fixed-term versus indefinite-term workers.  Accordingly, we model wage growth and job 
mobility as functions of the contract type held in the past by means of the following switching 
regression model: 
(1)   
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JMit  indicates whether the ith employee switched jobs between t-1 and t, according to which 
workers are classified as job movers versus job stayers.  CT is a set of contract type dummies at 
t-1, and X is a vector of personal and job-related characteristics.
15   t i w 0 ∆  and   refer to the 
wage growth rate between t and t-1 of employee i had she stayed in or moved from her job 
during that period, respectively.  Obviously, we only observe one of those states (depending on 
the realization of JM
t i w 1 ∆
it) while the other remains latent.  Unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity 
is captured by λi and (uit, εi0t, εi1t) is a vector of idiosyncratic errors. 
There are several estimation issues we need to take into account to obtain consistent 
estimates of the effect of contract type on wage growth for job stayers and movers (vectors 
01 β and  11 β , respectively).  First and foremost is the simultaneity of job mobility and wage 
growth, provided that wages (observed and latent) are a major factor in hiring and job separation 
decisions for both employers and employees.  This simultaneity prevents us from estimating a 
linear regression model with observed wage growth as the dependent variable.  Instead, the 
system of equations in (1) should be estimated using an endogenous switching regression model 
                                                       
15 Personal characteristics include gender, marital status, family size, educational attainment, experience, experience 
squared, and health limitations. Job-related variables include occupation, industry, and type of sector (e.g. private or 
public). In addition, a set of region dummies is included to control for geographic differences in macroeconomic 
conditions affecting the Spanish labor market. 
16 that allows for unobserved heterogeneity included in the error terms.  One of such approaches is 
provided in Lee's (1976) two-step estimator.
16  In the first step, the job mobility equation is 
estimated using a probit model for each period separately.  The second step consists on 
estimating the following equation by OLS: 
(2) 
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t δ  represents the first-step estimate of 
0123 (,,,) δ δδδδ .  T = he error term in (2) includes the unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. 
it i it η λυ =+).  The model is identified by the assumption that the joint distribution of (uit, εi0t, 
εi1t) is normal with zero mean and var( ) 1 it u =  (Campos et al. 2003).
17  
The estimates obtained from (2) are consistent only if  i λ  is uncorrelated to the regressors 
in (2).  Because the unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be correlated with some of the 
explanatory variables, especially with contract type, we instead estimate equation (2) by fixed 
effects as follows (Campos et al. 2003):  
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In this manner, we control for the simultaneity of job mobility and wage growth while allowing 
the unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with the explanatory variables and with the 
selection correction terms   and  . 
' ˆ ( ti t Y δ Φ
' ˆ () ti t Y φδ
 
16 See Campos et al. (2003) for a detailed description of this approach, which they apply to the study of risk 
exposure and firms' legal form. 
17 The latter is implicit in the first-step of the estimation by using a probit model to estimate the job mobility 
equation. 
17 VI.  Wage Growth Implication of Fixed-term Employment  
Table 3 displays the coefficient estimates for fixed-term work from the two-step pooled 
specification (equation (2)) as well as from our final fixed-effects model (equation (3)).  Yet, we 
know that, as the wage growth implications of fixed-term employment may vary substantially by 
contract duration, grouping all fixed-term workers masks the wage growth effects associated 
with different fixed-term work contracts.  Therefore, Table 4 shows the results from the analysis 
when we distinguish by contract length.  As in Table 3, we display the results from the two-step 
pooled and fixed-effects specifications.  Much of the superior wage performance of past fixed-
term employees relative to past employees with indefinite-term contracts (captured by the beta 
coefficients) disappears as we account for workers’ unobserved heterogeneity in the fixed-effects 
specification.  Yet, we focus our discussion on this more complete model specification.  
Specifically, we group the estimated fixed-effects model coefficients from Table 3 and Table 4 
in Table 5 to facilitate the interpretation of our findings.  As a result, Table 5 displays the wage 
growth implications of the fixed-term nature of the work contract held by the worker and for job 
mobility during the past year.  These effects are computed using the coefficients on past fixed-
term employment and job mobility from the fixed-effects model in Table 3 as well as those in 
Table 4 when distinguishing by the duration of the fixed-term contract previously held.  
Additionally, Table 5 shows the corresponding joint significance tests.   
According to the figures in Table 5, we find no significant differences in the wage growth 
profiles of past fixed-term and indefinite-term workers who switch jobs as they both benefit from 
job mobility.  Past indefinite-term workers benefit the most from job mobility, which is not 
surprising considering the job security, fringe benefit, and salary advantages to having a more 
stable type of job.  As such, workers with indefinite-term contracts are only expected to quit their 
18 jobs if they are offered better employment opportunities.  Likewise, fixed-term and other 
informal sector employees should benefit from voluntary job mobility.  Consequently, we find 
no statistically significant differences in the wage growth rates experienced by fixed-term 
relative to indefinite-term job movers.  A similar result applies to informal sector employees 
switching jobs over the course of a year.     
However, we do find significant wage growth differences between job stayers with fixed-
term contracts and their counterparts with indefinite-term contracts a year earlier.  After all, 
while employees with indefinite-term contracts experience most of their wage growth via job 
mobility, wage growth among fixed-term workers occurs both via job mobility as well as on-the-
job.  On-the-job wage growth among fixed-term employees may be the payoff to their greater 
effort in an attempt to keep their jobs (Alba-Ramirez 1994) or a by-product of the conversion of 
their temporary work status to indefinite after a preliminary probationary or screening process 
(e.g. Loh (1994) and Wang and Weiss (1998)).  As a result, wages of past fixed-term workers 
who are able to keep their jobs over a one year period grow by 4 percentage points more than 
those of similar job stayers with indefinite work contracts.  When further distinguishing fixed-
term workers according to the duration of their contractual agreements, we find that only 
employees with short-lived contracts of up to 6-months enjoy a 10.5 percentage points higher 
wage growth than their more permanent counterparts.  The fact this group of temporary workers 
are the ones to benefit the most from keeping their jobs is not surprising considering they have 
been able to keep their jobs beyond the stipulated contract duration.  Furthermore, the vast 
majority is promoted to a longer-lasting position within the firm; only 16 percent still hold a 
(renewed) 6-months contract one year later (see Table 1).  Nonetheless, given the limited number 
of fixed-term workers with a contract lasting less than 6-months who manage to keep their jobs 
19 beyond their initial contractual agreement, the overall wage gap between past fixed-term and 
indefinite-term workers is likely to persist in the short-run.         
Lastly, as for short-term workers, the figures in Table 5 confirm the fact that informal 
sector employees enjoy a 9 percentage points higher wage growth rates than similar counterparts 
with indefinite-term contracts a year earlier.  As noted earlier, this finding is not surprising to the 
extent that these are employees whose work relationships have been extended over a one year –
approximately 37 percent on a formal basis– despite their lack of a formally binding agreement.      
VII. Conclusions 
This paper uses Spanish data from the European Community Household Panel to 
examine the wage growth implications of fixed-term employment depending on the job mobility 
patterns experienced by the worker.  A couple of findings are worth summarizing.  First, wage 
growth for indefinite-term workers primarily occurs via job mobility.  To the extent that 
permanent workers enjoy jobs offering good working conditions, they should be less willing to 
switch jobs unless the job move implies a significant improvement as would be the case with 
wage gains.  In contrast, fixed-term workers experience similar wage gains via job mobility and 
on-the-job.  Consequently, we find no significantly different payoffs to job mobility between 
past indefinite and fixed-term workers.  Nevertheless, we do find disparities in the wage growth 
rates enjoyed by past indefinite and fixed-term job stayers.  Specifically, wages grow 4 
percentage points faster for job stayers with fixed-term contracts a year ago than for their 
counterparts with indefinite-term contracts.  As noted by Alba-Ramirez (1994), Loh (1994), and 
Wang and Weiss (1998) among others, the greater wage gains enjoyed by fixed-term workers 
could be explained by their greater effort in an attempt to keep their jobs or by the promotion or 
conversion of their initial contracts into longer lasting ones after a preliminary screening process.         
20 Secondly, we find that wage growth also varies with the duration of the fixed-term 
contract held by the worker.  Specifically, on-the-job wage gains are 10.5 percentage points 
greater for workers holding contracts lasting less than 6-months than for their counterparts 
holding indefinite-term contracts in the past.  Since wage growth is computed on a yearly basis, 
temporary job stayers holding contracts lasting less than 6-months one year ago are not 
surprisingly the ones to experience the largest wage gains.  After all, they have been able to keep 
their jobs beyond their initial contractual agreement and, in most instances, with a new longer-
lasting work contract (see Table 1).  However, to the extent that: a) fixed-term contracts of less 
than 6-months duration only account for less than 20 percent of all fixed-term employment, b) 
only an average of 34 percent of workers with contracts lasting less than 6-months are able to 
keep their jobs beyond their initial contract period,
18 the wage gap between past fixed-term and 
indefinite-term employees is unlikely to vanish in the near future.          
                                                       
18 Authors’ tabulations using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). 
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24 Table 1: Labor Force Transition Rates for Workers Leaving Their Previous Year Job 
 
Labor Force Status One Year Later 
Temporary Contract 




























Job Movers                      
Indefinite Contract  9.95  0.54  10.96  0.34  31.72               
                 
                 
                   
               
               
                    
                   
                   
                     
                 
                 
0.79 1.06 3.0e-04 0.52 5.55 16.51 24.06
Six-months Contract  65.66  18.03  18.17  4.67 15.62 0.18 2.89 0.35 1.26 1.19 25.29 10.72
One-year Contract  51.52  10.55  21.71  9.63 21.16 1.69 1.25 0.15 1.36 2.26 22.47 7.77
One-year Plus Contract   34.03  7.75  16.89 15.12 13.73 0.52 1.65 0.94 0.46 3.73 30.18 9.05
Other Contract  32.6  9.47  12.12  1.83  6.88 15.34 3.48 0.85 2.87 1.70 32.24 13.20
No Contract  30.9  6.38  14.32  4.43  14.55 1.90 6.14 0.00 2.56 7.17 32.13 10.40
Job Stayers 
Indefinite Contract  -  0.09  0.39 1.00 97.48 0.42 0.62 - - - - -
Six-months Contract  -  16.23  21.32 20.34 32.31 6.70 3.11 - - - - -
One-year Contract  -  5.85  31.12  19.12  39.72  0.98  3.21  -  -  -  -  - 
One-year Plus Contract   -  1.21 8.55 37.23 49.13 0.72 3.16 - - - - -
Other Contract  -  2.62  5.18  12.22 56.54 9.02 14.42 - - - - -
No Contract  -  5.58  4.38  5.34 22.30 50.07 12.33 - - - - -
Note: Number of Observations: 18,977 of which 2,485 experience some job mobility. 
 
 
25 Table 2: Average Hourly Wage Growth Rates by Type of Work Contract during the Previous Year 
(Comparison Group = Indefinite Contract Workers within Each Column Category) 
 
All  Job Movers  Job Stayers 
Type of Work Contract One Year Ago 
Average           
             
Difference Average Difference Average Difference
Indefinite  Contract 6.22 - 10.59 - 5.95 -
Six-months Contract  17.95  11.73*** 
(2.23)  17.29  6.70* 
(4.17)  19.06  13.11*** 
(3.91) 
One-year Contract  15.15  8.92*** 
(1.64)  14.15  3.57 
(3.71)  15.98  10.03*** 
(2.55) 
One-year Plus Contract   11.81  5.58*** 
(1.32)  13.12  2.53 
(4.47)  11.36  5.41*** 
(1.38) 
Other Contract  12.61  6.39*** 
(2.43)  27.37  16.79** 
(7.27)  7.81  1.86 
(2.35) 
No Contract  17.79  11.56*** 
(3.32)  13.65  3.07 
(6.81)  19.44  13.49*** 
(3.94) 
Number of Observations  19,063  2,853  16,210 
Note: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and * represents statistical significance at 





26  Table 3: Estimated Wage Growth Effects of Past Fixed-term Employment (S.E.) 
 
Independent Variables  Benchmark Model       
Pooled OLS  Final Fixed-Effects Model
    




Job Movers     
Fixed-term Contract One Year Ago    11 01 ()





Other Contract One Year Ago    11 01 ()





No Contract One Year Ago    11 01 ()





Job Stayers    


















Number of Observations  19,442  19,442 
Regression Fit Statistic
  F(128, 19,313) =  3.13  F(128, 13,365) =  2.09 
Note: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and * represents statistical 
significance at the 10% level.  The benchmark and final models are estimated as specified in equations [2] and [3], respectively.  The vector 
X contains the following information: marital status, family size, education, experience, experience squared, industry, occupation, a public 
sector employment dummy, a dummy indicative of any health limitations and region dummies.  The reference category for the type of 
work contract held is an indefinite term contract.   
 
 
 Table 4: Estimated Wage Growth Effects of Past Fixed-term Employment by Contract Duration (S.E.)  
 
Independent Variables  Benchmark Model          
Pooled OLS  Final Fixed-Effects Model 
    





Job Movers      























Job Stayers     






















Number of Observations  19,442  19,442 
Regression Fit Statistic
  F(132, 19,309) = 3.36  F(132, 13,361) = 2.09 
Note: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and * represents statistical 
significance at the 10% level.  The benchmark and final models are estimated as specified in equations [2] and [3], respectively.  The 
vector X contains the following information on: marital status, family size, education, experience, experience squared, industry, occupation, 
a public sector employment dummy, a dummy indicative of any health limitations and region dummies.  The reference category for the 
type of work contract held is an indefinite term contract.   
 
 Table 5: Wage Growth Implications of Past Fixed-term Employment of Varying Duration by Recent Job Mobility 
 
Group  Computation    Coefficient
Significance
(F-Statistic) 
Job Movers       
All Fixed-term vs. Indefinite-term Workers One Year Ago 
01
FT β + 11 01 ()
FTF T   ββ −     0.0527 0.16
Six-months Contract vs. Indefinite-term Workers One Year Ago  6
01
m β +   66
11 01 ()
mm ββ − 0.0164 1.12
 
One-year Contract vs. Indefinite-term Workers One Year Ago  1
01
y β + 11
11 01 ()
yy β β −   0.1785    0.48
One-year Plus Contract vs. Indefinite-term Workers One Year Ago  2
01
y β +   22
11 01 ()
yy ββ − -0.0890    0.59




oc oc β β −   0.3222    2.52




nc nc β β −   0.2977   
    
1.49
Job Stayers 
All Fixed-term vs. Indefinite-term Workers One Year Ago 
01
FT β   0.0387**    5.05
Six-months Contract vs. Indefinite-term Workers One Year Ago  6
01
m β   0.1045***    10.80
One-year Contract vs. Indefinite-term Workers One Year Ago  1
01
y β   0.0175    0.58
One-year Plus Contract vs. Indefinite-term Workers One Year Ago  2
01
y β   0.0338    2.29
Other Contract vs. Indefinite-term Workers One Year Ago  
01
oc β   -0.0178    0.22
No Contract vs. Indefinite-term Workers One Year Ago 
01
nc β   0.0915*    3.79
Notes:  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level or better, ** at the 5 percent level or better and * at the 10 percent level or better. 
+Joint significance 
evaluated using chi-squared statistic. 
 Appendix 
Fixed-term Contract Categories:  In addition to training and practical work contracts 
(typically lasting between 6 months and two years), four different types of fixed-term work 
contracts are currently contemplated by the Spanish legislation (Workers’ Statute, article 15.1, 
Royal Decree Law 2720/1998, Law 12/2001):  
 
(1)  Contracts for a specific task or service (contratos para obra ó servicio determinado):  
The reference to a specific purpose has a double meaning: to delimit the purpose of the contract 
as well as its duration.  As a result, the contract often has uncertain duration, expiring upon 
completion of the service contracted by the firm.   
 
(2)  Insertion contracts (contratos de inserción): This contract may be signed when the 
following circumstances are met: (a) the employee is registered as unemployed in the local 
employment office, (b) the employer is the public administration or a non-profit organization, 
and (c) the purpose of the contract is the completion of a task or service of public interest, or the 
acquisition of work experience through public programs that will increase the future 
employability of the worker.  The contract duration may be uncertain, as in the case of the 
contract for a specific task or service.  However, the worker cannot be re-hired in this contract 
category during the 3-year period following the expiration of the last insertion contract if the 
latter lasted more than 9 months.   
 
(3)  Casual employment contracts (contratos eventuales por circumstancias de la 
producción): This contract is designed to meet unexpected changes in the firms’ routine, such as 
an increase in export orders.  It has a maximum duration of 6 months within a period of one year.  
However, in the case of seasonal activities, the duration may be modified through collective 
bargaining to a maximum of 12 months within a period of 18 months.  If the contract has a 
shorter duration, it may be renewed once as long as the maximum duration is not exceeded.   
 
(4)  Fixed-term work contracts to fill a vacancy created by a worker on leave (contratos de 
interinidad): As in the case of the contract for a specific task or service or the insertion contract, 
the cause and duration of this fixed-term contract are determined by the vacancy created by a 
worker on leave.  Additionally, the legislation allows the public administration to use this fixed-
term contract to select workers for open positions within the public administration or to fill up 
the vacancy created by the early retirement of a worker.  However, in these instances, its 
duration cannot exceed 3 months and 12 months, respectively.   
 
Data:  The Household Panel of the European Union is a longitudinal survey carried out in the 
members of the European Union by their respective National Bureaus of Statistics, coordinated 
by the EU Bureau of Statistics (EUROSTAT), with the purpose of providing to the European 
Commission an statistical instrument to analyze the labor market, living conditions, and social 
cohesion in the EU.  The survey is conducted annually using a fixed Panel.  The first wave was 
conducted in 1994 and the last one in the year 2001.  The population being targeted is the 
Spanish private household settled in the entire Spanish territory, with the exception of Ceuta and 
Melilla, and born in or before 1977 as of the first wave.  The survey counts with 8,000 Spanish 
households, 70,000 for the whole European Union. 
 
30 Table A: Variable Descriptions, Means, and Standard Deviations 
Variables Description  Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
    
Wage Growth Rate 
 
Wage growth rate from t-1 to t  0.0908 
(0.0037) 
































Age  Age of the respondent  37.3594 
(0.0876) 




Married Dummy  variable  for marital status  0.5753 
(0.0043) 




Health Limitation  Dummy variable equal to one if having a health limitation to do the 
individual’s regular daily activity. 
0.0410 
(0.0016) 




















Managers/Directors  Dummy variable for managerial and directing occupations  0.0281 
(0.0014) 
Professionals/Technicians Dummy  variable for professional and technical occupations 0.1476 
(0.0033) 




Office Workers  Dummy variable for administrative and office workers  0.1123 
(0.0029) 
Agriculture Workers  Dummy variable for agriculture and fishing occupations  0.0147 
(0.0009) 




Service Workers  Dummy variable for service occupations  0.1340 
(0.0026) 
Operatives Dummy  variable for operatives  0.0977 
(0.0024) 
Nonqualified  Dummy variable for non-qualified positions  0.1603 
(0.0031) 
 
31 Table A – Continued 
Variables Description  Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
    
Agriculture  Dummy variable for the agriculture industry  0.0375 
(0.0015) 
Extractive  Dummy variable for the mining industry  0.0168 
(0.0011) 
Manufacturing  Dummy variable for the manufacturing industries  0.2116 
(0.0033) 
Construction  Dummy variable for the construction industry  0.1122 
(0.0027) 
Commerce  Dummy variable for the commerce and Tourism industries  0.1648 
(0.0029) 
Finance/Real State  Dummy variable for the finance and real state industries  0.1096 
(0.0033) 
Transport and Telecommunications  Dummy variable for the commerce and telecommunications industries  0.0558 
(0.0018) 
Social Services  Dummy variable for the social services industry  0.1341 
(0.0030) 
Education  Dummy variable for the education industry  0.0769 
(0.0023) 
Public Administration  Dummy variable for the public administration industry  0.0808 
(0.0020) 
Public Sector  Dummy variable for the public sector   0.2254 
(0.0034) 
Northwest  Dummy variable for living in the northwestern region  0.0946 
(0.0022) 
Northeast  Dummy variable for living in the northeastern region  0.1121 
(0.0023) 
Center  Dummy variable for living in the central region  0.2695 
(0.0040) 
East  Dummy variable for living in the eastern region  0.2955 
(0.0039) 
South  Dummy variable for living in the southern region  0.1798 
(0.0031) 
Canary Islands  Dummy variable for living in the Canary islands  0.0363 
(0.0011) 
 
32 Table B:  Means, and Standard Deviations by Type of Contract 
Variables  six-months   1-year   2+-year   Indefinite  












































































































































































































































33 Table B – Continued 
Variables  six-months   1-year   2+-year   Indefinite  
      
































No. Observations  948  1,753  1,325  13,749 
 
34 